State of Utah v. Danny Bryan : Brief of Appellee by Utah Court of Appeals
Brigham Young University Law School
BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Court of Appeals Briefs
1999
State of Utah v. Danny Bryan : Brief of Appellee
Utah Court of Appeals
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca2
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief Submitted to the Utah Court of Appeals; digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law
Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University, Provo, Utah; machine-generated
OCR, may contain errors.
Jan Graham; attorney general; Kris C. Leonard; Assistant Attorney General; Curtis Larson; Deputy
Utah County Attorney; attorneys for appellee.
Randall Gaither; attorney for appellant.
This Brief of Appellee is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Court of
Appeals Briefs by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. Policies regarding these Utah briefs are available at
http://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/utah_court_briefs/policies.html. Please contact the Repository Manager at hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu with
questions or feedback.
Recommended Citation
Brief of Appellee, Utah v. Bryan, No. 990903 (Utah Court of Appeals, 1999).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca2/2389
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, : 
Plaintiff/Appellee, : Case No. 990903-CA 
v. : 
DANNY BRYAN, : Priority No. 2 
Defendant/Appellant. : 
BRIEF OF APPELLEE 
APPEAL FROM A CONVICTION OF POSSESSION OF METHAMPHETAMINE 
WITH INTENT TO DISTRIBUTE IN A DRUG FREE ZONE, A SECOND DEGREE 
FELONY, IN VIOLATION OF UTAH CODE ANN. § 58-37-8(l)(A)(IV) (1998); 
POSSESSION OF MARIJUANA IN A DRUG FREE ZONE, A CLASS A 
MISDEMEANOR, IN VIOLATION OF UTAH CODE ANN. § 58-37-8(2)(A)(I) (1998); 
POSSESSION OF DRUG PARAPHERNALIA IN A DRUG FREE ZONE, A CLASS A 
MISDEMEANOR, IN VIOLATION OF UTAH CODE ANN. § 58-37A-5(A) (1998), IN 
THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, 
STATE OF UTAH, THE HONORABLE JOHN A. ROKICH, PRESIDING 
KRIS C. LEONARD (4902) 
Assistant Attorney General 
JAN GRAHAM (1231) 
Utah Attorney General 
160 East 300 South, 6th Floor 
P. O. Box 140854 
Salt Lake City, UT 84114-0854 
RANDALL GAITHER(1141) Telephone: (801) 366-0180 
321 South 600 East 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84102 CURTIS LARSON
 C | | — - . 
Telephone: (801)531-1990 Deputy Utah County AlTcfLED 
Attorneys for Appellant Attorneys for AppeUh* Court of ADo**fc 
JUN 2 9 ? *^ 
JuHa D'Alesandro 
Clerk of the Court Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, : 
Plaintiff/Appellee, : Case No. 990903-CA 
v. : 
DANNY BRYAN, : Priority No. 2 
Defendant/Appellant. 
BRIEF OF APPELLEE 
APPEAL FROM A CONVICTION OF POSSESSION OF METHAMPHETAMINE 
WITH INTENT TO DISTRIBUTE IN A DRUG FREE ZONE, A SECOND DEGREE 
FELONY, IN VIOLATION OF UTAH CODE ANN. § 58-37-8(1 )(A)(IV) (1998); 
POSSESSION OF MARIJUANA IN A DRUG FREE ZONE, A CLASS A 
MISDEMEANOR, IN VIOLATION OF UTAH CODE ANN. § 58-37-8(2)(A)(I) (1998); 
POSSESSION OF DRUG PARAPHERNALIA IN A DRUG FREE ZONE, A CLASS A 
MISDEMEANOR, IN VIOLATION OF UTAH CODE ANN. § 58-37A-5(A) (1998), IN 
THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, 
STATE OF UTAH, THE HONORABLE JOHN A. ROKICH, PRESIDING 
KRIS C. LEONARD (4902) 
Assistant Attorney General 
JAN GRAHAM (1231) 
Utah Attorney General 
160 East 300 South, 6th Floor 
P. O. Box 140854 
Salt Lake City, UT 84114-0S54 
Telephone: (801) 366-0180 
CURTIS LARSON 
Deputy Utah County Attorney 
Attorneys for Appellee 
RANDALL GAITHER (1141) 
321 South 600 East 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84102 
Telephone: (801) 531-1990 
Attorneys for Appellant 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
Page 
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES iii 
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS 1 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL AND STANDARDS 
OF APPELLATE REVIEW 2 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, AND RULES 4 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 4 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 5 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENTS 8 
ARGUMENT 9 
I. THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ABUSE ITS DISCRETION IN 
DENYING DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR NEW TRIAL 
WHEN IT SUSTAINED DEFENDANT'S OBJECTION TO A 
WITNESS' BRIEF STATEMENT AND ISSUED AN IMMEDIATE 
CURATIVE INSTRUCTION AND A SUBSEQUENT APPLICABLE 
WRITTEN INSTRUCTION 9 
II. THE PROSECUTOR DID NOT COMMIT PROSECUTORIAL 
MISCONDUCT BECAUSE HIS REBUTTAL CLOSING 
REMARKS WERE A REASONABLE INTERPRETATION 
OF THE EVIDENCE ADDUCED AT TRIAL 17 
III. DEFENDANT IS NOT ENTITLED TO DOUBLE JEOPARDY 
PROTECTION BECAUSE HE HAS NOT ESTABLISHED 
THAT THE PROSECUTOR ENGAGED IN BAD FAITH 
CONDUCT WITH THE INTENT TO PROVOKE A MISTRIAL 
IN ORDER TO OBTAIN A MORE FAVORABLE OPPORTUNITY 
TO CONVICT 20 
i 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
CONCLUSION 
ADDENDA 
ADDENDUM A - Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-8 (1998) 
Utah Code Ann. § 58-37a-5 (1998) 
ADDENDUM B - Trial Transcript (R. 335:20-26) 
Jury Instruction 36 (R. 161) 
ADDENDUM C - Trial Transcript (closing arguments) (R. 335:184-86) 
ii 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES 
STATE CASES 
Arellano v. Western Pacific R.R. Co.. 5 Utah 2d 146, 298 P.2d 527 (Utah 1956) 3 
State v. Bakalov. 1999 UT 45, 979 P.2d 799 18,19 
State v. Basta. 966 P.2d 260 (Utah App. 1998) 3, 18 
State v. Bovatt. 854 P.2d 550 (Utah App.), 
cert, denied. 862 P.2d 1356 (Utah 1993) 12, 17 
State v. Carlson. 934 P.2d 657 (Utah App. 1997) 3, 18 
State v. Colwell. 2000 UT 8, 994 P.2d 177 2, 11, 16 
State v. Cummins. 839 P.2d 848 (Utah App. 1992), 
cert, denied. 853 P.2d 897 (Utah 1993) 3 
State v. Dunn. 850 P.2d 1201 (Utah 1993) 19 
State v. Fox. 709 P.2d 316 (Utah 1985) 17 
State v. Harmon. 956 P.2d 262 (Utah 1998) 12, 16 
State v. Kohl. 2000 UT 35, 999 P.2d 7 12, 16 
State v. Layman. 1999 UT 79. 985 P.2d 911 16 
State v. Layman. 953 P.2d 782 (Utah App. 1998) 16 
State v. Longshaw. 961 P.2d 925 (Utah App. 1998) 3, 12, 16 
State v. Maguire. 1999 UT App. 45, 975 P.2d 476 3 
State v. Peters. 796 P.2d 708 (Utah App. 1990) 11, 13, 17 
State y. Saunders. 1999 UT 59, 992 P.2d 951 12 
State v. Stephens. 946 P.2d 734 (Utah App. 1997) 12, 17 
iii 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
State v. Tennev. 913 P.2d 750 (Utah App.), 
cert, denied. 923 P.2d 693 (Utah 1996) 3 
State v. Trafnv. 799 P.2d 704 (Utah 1990) 21, 22 
State v. Trov. 688 P.2d 483 (Utah 1984) 12 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, AND RULES 
Utah Code Ann. §23-20-3 (1998) 4 
Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-8 (1998) 1,4 
Utah Code Ann. § 58-37a-5 (1998) 1,4 
Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3 (1996) 1 
Utah R. Evid. 404 11 
iv 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, : 
Plaintiff/Appellee, : Case No. 990903-CA 
v. : 
DANNY BRYAN, : Priority No. 2 
Defendant/Appellant. : 
BRIEF OF APPELLEE 
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS 
This appeal is from convictions for possession of methamphetamine with intent to 
distribute in a drug free zone, a second degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 
58-37-8(l)(a)(iv) (1998); possession of marijuana in a drug free zone, a class A 
misdemeanor, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-8(2)(a)(i) (1998); and possession 
of drug paraphernalia in a drug free zone, a class A misdemeanor, in violation of Utah 
Code Ann. § 58-37a-5(a) (1998) (in Add. A). 
This Court has jurisdiction to hear the appeal under Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-
3(2)(e) (1996). 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL 
AND STANDARDS OF APPELLATE REVIEW1 
1. Did the trial court abuse its discretion in not granting a new trial based on a 
brief statement linking drugs to defendant's house prior to the instant charges where the 
trial court sustained defendant's objection at trial and gave the requested curative 
instruction, and the written jury instructions addressed the point? 
"When reviewing a trial court's denial of a motion for a new trial, [this Court] will 
not reverse 'absent a clear abuse of discretion by the trial court.'" State v. Colwelh 2000 
UT 8,1j 12, 994 P.2d 177 (quoting State v. Harmon, 956 P.2d 262, 265-66 (Utah 1998)). 
2. Did the trial court abuse its discretion when it denied defendant's motion for 
new trial and motion for mistrial based on alleged prosecutorial misconduct during the 
prosecutor's rebuttal closing remarks? 
To obtain a reversal for prosecutorial misconduct, defendant must show that 
"'[t]he actions or remarks of [the prosecutor] call to the attention of the jury a matter it 
would not be justified in considering in determining its verdict,' and 'under the 
circumstances of the particular case,.. . the error is substantial and prejudicial such that 
there is a reasonable likelihood that, in its absence, there would have been a more 
defendant's third point is a duplication of his first point, with the exception of the 
final paragraph and his use of the word "appellant" in the heading of the third argument. 
Br. of Aplt. at 12-18, 20-25. The first three paragraphs of defendant's fourth argument 
are identical to his entire second argument. Br. of Aplt. at 18-19, 26-27. For the reader's 
ease, the State has reorganized defendant's major points into three arguments. 
2 
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favorable result.'" State v. Carlson. 934 P.2d 657, 661 n.5 (Utah App. 1997) (quoting 
State v. Tennev. 913 P.2d 750, 754-55 (Utah App.) (citations omitted), cert, denied. 923 
P.2d 693 (Utah 1996)); see also State v. Basta. 966 P.2d 260, 268 (Utah App. 1998). 
When reviewing a trial court's ruling on a claim of prosecutorial misconduct, an 
appellate court will not overturn the ruling absent an abuse of discretion "because the trial 
court is in the best position to determine the impact of a statement upon the 
proceedings[.]" State v. Longshaw. 961 P.2d 925, 927 (Utah App. 1998) (motion for new 
trial); State v. Cummins. 839 P.2d 848, 852 (Utah App. 1992) (motion for mistrial), cert, 
denied. 853 P.2d 897 (Utah 1993). ""In other words, unless [the trial court's] 
determination appears to be so unreasonable that upon review it appears that [the court] 
was plainly wrong, in that there is a strong likelihood that the plaintiff could not have had 
a fair trial, we cannot say that [the court's] failure to grant one was an abuse of 
discretion.'" Arellano v. Western Pac. R.R. Co.. 5 Utah 2d 146, 150,298 P.2d 527, 530 
(Utah 1956) (quoting Burton v. Zions Coop. Mercantile Inst.. 122 Utah 360, 365, 249 
P.2d 514, 517 (Utah 1952)); see also Tennev. 913 P.2d at 754-55. 
3. Was the prosecutor's conduct at trial intended to provoke a mistrial so as to 
obtain a more favorable opportunity to convict, thereby barring retrial on double jeopardy 
grounds? 
This issue involves a constitutional interpretation that presents a question of law. 
State v. Maguire. 1999 UT App. 45, ^  5, 975 P.2d 476. "'We review a trial court's 
3 
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conclusions of law for correctness, granting no deference to the trial judge's legal 
determinations/" kL (quoting Meadowbrook. LLC v. Flower. 959 P.2d 115, 116 (Utah 
1998)). 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, AND RULES 
There are no constitutional, statutory, or rule provisions pertinent to the resolution 
of the issues presented on appeal. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Defendant and his wife, Debbie, were tried together on charges of possession of 
methamphetamine with intent to distribute in a drug free zone, a first degree felony, in 
violation of Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-8(l)(a)(iv) (1998); possession of marijuana in a 
drug free zone, a class A misdemeanor, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-8(2)(a)(i) 
(1998); unlawful possession of drug paraphernalia in a drug free zone, a class A 
misdemeanor, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 58-37a-5(a) (1998), and unlawful 
possession of protected wildlife, a class B misdemeanor, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 
23-20-3 (1998) (R. 3-4). 
Defendant moved for a mistrial during the testimony of the first trial witness (R. 
335:21-24). He moved to dismiss and renewed his mistrial motion at the close of the 
State's case (R. 335:121-28), and moved for a new trial and a mistrial during jury 
deliberations (R. 221-22, 226-27, 244-57, 287-91; 335:188-90). All motions were denied 
(R. 292; 335:24, 127, 129). 
4 
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A jury convicted both defendant and his wife of the first four counts, as charged, 
and acquitted them of the last count (R. 198-99; 335:190-91).2 The trial court granted 
defendant's post-trial motion to reduce the first degree felony to a second degree felony 
and sentenced him to serve one-to-fifteen years in prison for the felony, and one year each 
for the two misdemeanor convictions (R. 328-29, 332). The court then suspended the 
incarceration time and placed defendant on 90 days home confinement (R. 332). 
Defendant timely appealed the trial court's sentencing order (R. 307). 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The Bedroom Search: 
At 5:25 a.m. on May 12, 1997, Officer Steve Adams and five other officers 
executed a search warrant on defendant's home at 88 North 700 East in Spanish Fork, 
Utah (R. 335:20, 26-28). The home is directly across the street from an elementary 
school (R. 335:58-59). The officers had to knock down both the locked front door and 
defendant's bolted bedroom door (R. 335:27, 104-05). Acting on information they had 
received about drug activity at the house, the officers secured the six people they found 
inside and began their search for drug-related evidence (R. 335:20, 27-28). 
A search of defendants' bedroom revealed a hole that had been knocked into the 
plaster and lathe ceiling (R. 335:35). The bedroom had high ceilings, and two of the 
2Citation herein to the transcript will be to the volume number stamped on the 
cover of the transcript volume, followed by a colon and the internal page number, i.e., R. 
335:7. 
5 
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walls in the room contained floor-to-ceiling built-in units with cabinets at the top and 
several drawers near the floor (R. 335:31-32). By opening one of the cabinet doors and 
standing on the drawers beneath the cabinet, an officer was able to reach into the hole and 
retrieve several items within arm's length of the opening (R. 335:34-35). 
Inside the hole they found a soft pouch containing a coin purse which itself 
contained four "little pouches" of methamphetamine totaling 15.8 grams-more than 
fifteen times the amount normally possessed for individual use (R. 335:36, 57, 90, 103). 
Also in the pouch were six syringes (R. 335:41, 51). A second pouch retrieved from 
inside the hole contained a white substance suspected of being a cutting agent used to 
dilute the strength of the methamphetamine to increase the amount available for sale and, 
hence, the profit obtained (R. 335:42-44, 86-87). 
The State's Evidence: 
The State put on evidence of the items seized from the hole in the ceiling of 
defendant's bedroom. An officer noted that the amount of methamphetamine for personal 
use would weigh anywhere from one quarter to one gram and that one gram would cost 
approximately $100 (R. 335:57, 100). He also testified that in his experience, when 
officers locate methamphetamine intended for distribution, it is generally packaged in 
amounts from one to four grams and there is usually evidence that it has been or will be 
cut, i.e., diluted to increase profits (R. 335:57). 
6 
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The State also offered a box containing crushed marijuana leaves which was found 
on top of a microwave oven in the kitchen (R. 335:61-64). 
The Defendant's Evidence: 
Defendants' joint theory was that the methamphetamine and paraphernalia found 
in his bedroom ceiling belonged to one of the other four people found in the house. To 
support this theory, defendant adduced evidence that others lived in the house and that 
other drug-related items were found in other areas of the house and on the persons of the 
other men, including: two syringes found in the back pocket of one of the other men (R. 
335:69), one syringe found on another individual (R. 335:84-85), and paraphernalia and 
methamphetamine found in their sixteen-year-old son's bedroom (R. 335:73-80, 96). 
In support of the claim that someone else was keeping the drugs in the attic, 
defendant's wife took the stand and suggested that there was access to the attic area from 
an opening located near the roof outside the house and a "door" in the ceiling in the 
washroom (R. 335:140, 148). She also testified that, while there was a hole in the 
bedroom ceiling with insulation sticking out of it, there was no real access to the attic 
from the bedroom until the officers enlarged the hole in the ceiling with a golf club-a 
claim the police denied (R. 335:79-80, 136-37, 149). 
After deliberating two hours, the jury rejected the defense and convicted both 
defendants of the drug-related offenses as charged (R. 199; 335:190-91). 
7 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENTS 
Point I: The trial court properly denied defendant's motion for mistrial made 
immediately after the State's first witness made a brief, isolated reference to a previous 
drug sale at defendant's home. The reference had little, if any, impact on the jury when 
the jury had already been told, without objection, that there had been previous drug 
activity at the house, the remark was brief and isolated, the objection was immediate and 
sustained, a curative instruction was given at defendant's request, and the jury was 
advised by the written instructions to not speculate as to why the court did not allow 
certain evidence. Defendant does not establish any intentional wrongdoing by the 
prosecutor, and the evidence against defendants on the methamphetamine possession 
charge was compelling. 
Point II: The prosecutor's reference in closing to defendants' home as a "drug 
house" and to defendants as drug dealers does not constitute prosecutorial misconduct. 
Both sides are given considerable latitude in closing argument and both counsel may 
discuss the evidence from their point of view, including reasonable deductions and 
inferences arising therefrom. As the prosecutor's challenged remarks find support in the 
evidence adduced at trial, there was no misconduct warranting reversal. 
Point III: Defendant is not entitled to double jeopardy protection for two reasons. 
First, he has not established any error in the proceedings below which would trigger 
double jeopardy considerations. Second, although he argues that the State was 
8 
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responsible for the evidentiary error of which he complains, he does not establish that the 
prosecutor engaged in bad faith conduct with the intent to provoke a mistrial to obtain a 
more favorable opportunity to convict. Accordingly, his argument is without merit. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ABUSE ITS DISCRETION IN 
DENYING DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR NEW TRIAL WHEN IT 
SUSTAINED DEFENDANT'S OBJECTION TO A WITNESS' BRIEF 
STATEMENT AND ISSUED AN IMMEDIATE CURATIVE 
INSTRUCTION AND A SUBSEQUENT APPLICABLE WRITTEN 
INSTRUCTION 
Defendant takes exception to the trial court's denial of his motion for a mistrial 
made shortly after the first witness began testifying. Br. of Aplt. at 12-18, 20-25. That 
witness, Officer Steve Adams, obtained and helped execute the search warrant on 
defendant's home (R. 335:20-21, 26). After the prosecutor elicited testimony about the 
officer's training on writing search warrants, the following exchange occurred: 
[THE PROSECUTOR] Could you indicate to the jury the residence for which that 
search warrant was sought? 
A. We received probable cause that there was drug activity going on in a home in 
Spanish Fork being at 88 North 700 East, that being Debbie and Danny Bryan's 
home. 
Q. How did you know that was the Bryans' home? 
A. From past law enforcement experience, past involvements with the Bryans. 
Q. This information^] it provided, you indicated, probable cause. Could you 
explain what that is just briefly? 
9 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
MR. GAITHER: I'll object to the relevancy of that in these proceedings, vour 
Honor. 
THE COURT: I'll sustain the objection. I don't think it's relevant. 
[THE PROSECUTOR] The information you received was regarding what? 
A. Drug activity in the home, a previous sale. 
MR. GAITHER: Objection, your Honor. Move to strike. And I have a motion I 
think we should hear right now. 
THE COURT: All right. Let's excuse the jury for a few minutes and hear the 
motion.... 
(R. 335:20-21) (emphasis added) (in Add. B). 
Outside the jury's presence, the parties presented their arguments regarding 
defendant's motion for mistrial, after which the trial court ruled: 
Well, the answer to the question does go into the subject matter to which the Court 
had sustained the previous objection. However, I think it was an inadvertent 
response, and I'm going to deny your motion, Mr. Gaither, at this time. 
However, Mr. Larson, Fd caution you to not inquire into the subject matter of the 
warrant that was issued. The fact that it was issued is a legal matter anyway and 
what the cause for it would be. You're going to have to rely on direct evidence 
regarding the proof of your elements of distribution. 
(R. 335:24-25) (in Add. B). Defendant then sought a curative instniction from the court, 
which resulted in the following statement to the jury: 
THE COURT: Be seated, please. Okay. Before beginning, I want to instruct the 
jury to disregard any previous statements made and if you've made notes of them, 
to strike them and forget them. And the Court has determined that the issue of the 
search warrant is a legal matter, and the basis for the warrant has to do with 
elements of what we call probable cause. And that's a legal determination and one 
that I don't think you need to be concerned with, nor do I think it's relevant to the 
10 
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case. And that's why I have ordered any comments regarding it to be stricken. So 
you may proceed. 
(R. 335:25-26) (in Add. B). 
Defendant argues that testimony concerning "[d]rug activity in the home, a 
previous sale" was irrelevant, violated rule 404(b), Utah Rules of Evidence, and 
constituted inadmissible hearsay evidence. Br. of Aplt. at 13-15, 20-23. He then argues 
that the testimony was prejudicial because without it, the evidence was insufficient to 
establish either a nexus between defendant and the methamphetamine or the fact of 
possession with intent to distribute. Id, at 16-17, 24-25. Assuming, arguendo, that the 
testimony was inadmissible, defendant's claim fails as he has not established that the 
testimony was anything more than harmless. 
Utah courts have consistently held that a defendant is not prejudiced by the 
improper disclosure of evidence where (1) the evidence is immediately stricken upon 
objection; (2) a curative instruction is immediately given; (3) no further reference is made 
to that evidence; (4) an additional instruction on the issue is included in the final written 
instructions given to the jury; and (5) the evidence against defendant is sufficiently 
strong. See State v. Colwelh 2000 UT 8, ffl[ 37-38, 994 P.2d 177 (holding that, although 
it was ''error for the prosecutor to inquire into the details of the defendant's prior 
conviction," the error "was harmless because the questioning was suspended before the 
defendant could provide details to prejudice the jury and the jury was given adequate 
instruction on two separate occasions to disregard the evidence"); State v. Peters. 796 
11 
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P.2d 708, 712 (Utah App. 1990) (holding that although the jury "was in a position to 
speculate about whether [defendant] had . . . committed [another] crime, the court's 
limiting instruction minimized the danger of such speculation to the point of being 
harmless"); see also State v. Kohl. 2000 UT 35, ^  24, 999 P.2d 7; State v. Harmon. 956 
P.2d 262, 274-75 (Utah 1998); State v. Longshaw. 961 P.2d 925, 931 (Utah App. 1998); 
State v. Stephens. 946 P.2d 734, 737-38 (Utah App. 1997); State v. Bovatt. 854 P.2d 550, 
554-55 (Utah App.), cert, denied. 862 P.2d 1356 (Utah 1993). Cf State v. Saunders. 
1999 UT 59, TI29, 992 P.2d 951 (finding prejudice where trial court erroneously admitted 
evidence of defendant's alleged prior criminal conduct and prosecutor's closing argument 
was "replete with direct references to defendant's alleged [prior] conduct") (emphasis 
added); State v. Trov. 688 P.2d 483, 487 (Utah 1984) (holding that repeated improper 
questions and argument by prosecutor were prejudicial where evidence was not 
compelling) (emphasis added). 
In this case, the testimony had little, if any, effect on the jury.. First, it was largely 
cumulative. The jury had already been informed, without objection, that the search 
warrant was based on prior drug activity at defendant's house (R. 335:20). That activity 
was not tied to a particular person or to a particular time. The sole piece of new 
information provided in the challenged statement is the phrase, "a previous sale" (R. 
335:21). Again, the phrase is not tied to a particular person or time nor does it indicate 
whether the person(s) at defendant's home purchased or sold. Further, nothing suggests 
12 
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this additional information was intentionally elicited. Given the previous testimony that 
there was drug activity in the home and the defense that others in the home used and 
possessed drugs, this phrase adds very little to the case. 
Second, it was a brief, isolated statement. The objection was immediate, the 
motion for a mistrial was presented and argued, and the curative instruction was given 
without unnecessary delay or embellishment. Following the curative instruction, the 
prosecutor pursued unrelated questions, and the issue was not revisited.3 
Third, the court admonished the jury not to consider the testimony and to cross it 
off any notes the jurors might have taken (R. 335:25-26). Such an admonition is 
generally deemed to be curative. Peters, 796 P.2d at 712. 
Fourth, nothing supports defendant's claim that the prosecutor intentionally 
elicited the challenged testimony for improper purposes. Br. of Aplt. at 18-19, 26-27. 
See Point III, infra. The prosecutor expressly stated that he was intending to establish a 
basis for the search warrant and the officers' conduct, and his avoidance of the subject 
throughout the remainder of the trial weighs against defendant's claim of bad faith 
conduct. 
3Defendant argues that the prosecutor's comments in closing argument concerning 
this being a drug house and defendants being drug dealers color the challenged exchange. 
Br. of Aplt. at 16, 23-24. However, those comments are properly based on defendant's 
own evidence relating to drugs found throughout the house and the presence of others in 
the house at the time and on his theory that others in the home possessed and possibly 
dealt drugs. See Point II, infra. 
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Fifth, the statement was followed by defendant's immediate objection, which the 
trial court sustained. Thereafter, at defendant's request, the court gave a strong curative 
instruction, after which no further reference was made to the matter. Additionally, 
written jury instruction 36 provides: 
At times I have ruled upon objections to the admission of certain things into 
evidence. Questions relating to admissibility of evidence are solely questions of 
law and you must not concern yourself with my reasons for ruling as I have, or 
draw any inferences therefrom in favor of or against either party. In admitting 
evidence to which an objection is made, the Court does not determine what weight 
should be given such evidence; nor does it pass on the credibility of the witness. 
As to any question to which an objection was sustained, you must not conjecture 
as to what the answer might have been or as to the reason for the objection. 
(R. 161) (in Add. B). 
Finally, the evidence against defendants on the methamphetamine possession 
charge at issue was compelling. The drugs and paraphernalia were located in defendant's 
home, behind his locked bedroom door, within arm's reach of an opening knocked in the 
ceiling of defendant's bedroom (R. 335:27, 34-36, 41-44, 104-05, 150-51). The only 
other access to the drugs was from the ceiling of the washroom in another part of the 
house or an opening located near the roof on the outside of the house, both of which were 
separated from the drugs by large quantities of insulation that defendant had put inside the 
attic (R. 335:140, 148-49). Nothing suggests that drugs or paraphemalia were found in 
these other areas of the attic. 
14 
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The hole in the bedroom ceiling was concealed by the doors of one of defendant's 
closets and was readily accessed by standing on built-in drawers underneath the closet (R. 
335:31-35). Defendant exercised control over the room and its contents, locking the door 
with a deadbolt to keep others out (R. 335:27, 104-05, 150-51). No evidence was offered 
that anything in defendants' bedroom belonged to someone else or that anyone else 
exercised any dominion or control over the room or its contents. Nor was there any 
explanation why anyone other than defendants would keep that quantity of drugs in a 
location to which they would not have 24-hour access. There were numerous other places 
in the house where someone else could have put drugs so that they would have more 
ready access to them. In fact, the police found drugs in other areas of the home (R. 
335:67-71,73-80,84-85,96). 
The requisite intent was readily established by the quantity and packaging of the 
drugs and the presence of the cutting agent. The State's evidence established that the 
amount of methamphetamine for personal use generally ranges from one quarter to one 
gram, and that one gram costs approximately $100 (R. 335:57, 100). Defendants 
possessed four "little pouches" of methamphetamine totaling 15.8 grams-more than 
fifteen times the amount normally possessed for individual use (R. 335:36, 57, 90, 103). 
This stash was worth more than $1500.00 and was found next to a cutting agent used to 
increase the amount of methamphetamine available for sale and, hence, profit (R. 335:42-
44, 86-87). 
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All this evidence strongly suggests an exclusivity of dominion and an intent to 
control on defendants' part, thereby establishing either actual or constructive possession.4 
See State v. Fox, 709 P.2d 316, 319 (Utah 1985) (constructive possession requires proof 
that "there [is] a sufficient nexus between the accused and the drug to permit an inference 
that the accused had both the power and the intent to exercise dominion and control over 
the drug.") 
In sum, the trial court quickly minimized any potential harm caused by the brief, 
isolated statement about a previous sale. That quick action was followed by a final 
written instruction on the point. The error was not intentional, and no further reference 
was made to the statement. Finally, the evidence concerning defendants' possession of 
the methamphetamine was overwhelming under the circumstances. Thus, regardless of 
whether error occurred in the uttering of the challenged statement, there is no reasonable 
likelihood that, in its absence, there would have been a more favorable result for 
defendant. Kohl, at ^ 24; Colwell, at ffif 37-38; Harmon, 956 P.2d at 274-75; Longshaw. 
4If this Court looks to constructive possession in determining the sufficiency of the 
evidence, it should disregard defendant's reference to State v. Layman, 953 P.2d 782 
(Utah App. 1998), and the reasonable alternative hypothesis language in that case. Br. of 
Aplt. at 17-18, 24-25. The Utah Supreme Court granted certiorari review in Layman and, 
while affirming the outcome, determined that the reasonable alternative hypothesis 
discussion had no place in deciding the case. Instead, the Court held that the constructive 
possession issues "should have been decided by applying an ordinary sufficiency of the 
evidence test." State v. Lavman, 1999 UT 79,110,985 P.2d 911. 
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961 P.2d at 931; Stephens, 946 P.2d at 737-38; Boyatt, 854 P.2d at 554-55; Peters, 796 
P.2dat712. 
POINT II 
THE PROSECUTOR DID NOT COMMIT PROSECUTORIAL 
MISCONDUCT BECAUSE HIS REBUTTAL CLOSING REMARKS 
WERE A REASONABLE INTERPRETATION OF THE EVIDENCE 
ADDUCED AT TRIAL 
In closing argument, the State pointed to the evidence which it contended 
established the requisite elements of the charged crimes (R. 335:160-68). Defense 
counsel then identified in closing argument the evidence relating to other drugs, 
paraphernalia, and people present in the house at the time the search warrant was 
executed, arguing that the presence of other people who had both proximity and access to 
other drugs supported the defense that the drugs stashed in defendants' bedroom ceiling 
may well have belonged to someone else (R. 335:172-81). The prosecutor stated in 
rebuttal: 
[Jury instruction n]o. 20, defense counsel spent a lot of time on the nexus 
between the defendant and the drugs. All I can say is from what you have heard is 
the defendants carried on a drug house. If you look at the evidence that was 
brought in - and if you want to know the reason the State didn't bring in this 
particular canister or this or that is because they were found in different rooms. 
This was found in the defendants' child's room. And this, of course, was located 
next to that. Does that bring or cast a disparaging point at the State because we 
didn't use evidence that tends to incriminate somebody else? No, it doesn't. All 
this does is serve to show that the defendants were in a drug house, and that was 
brought in by the defense in that regard. 
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Now, once again, I would request that you go into your deliberations, you 
use the faculties that you've been given, you apply the facts as they've been 
presented, and you apply the law that has been presented, and you find the 
defendants guilty of all the counts charged, especially the possession of a drug 
with intent to distribute because they are drug dealers, and this case will prove it. 
Thank you. 
(R. 335:184-86) (emphasis added) (in Add. C). 
Defendant argues that the references to a drug house and to drug dealers 
constitutes prosecutorial misconduct because they called to the jury's attention a matter 
not proper for its consideration and they significantly influenced the verdict. Br. of Aplt. 
at 16, 23-24. 
To obtain a reversal for prosecutorial misconduct, defendant must show that 
"'[t]he actions or remarks of [the prosecutor] call to the attention of the jury a matter it 
would not be justified in considering in determining its verdict,' and 'under the 
circumstances of the particular case , . . . the error is substantial and prejudicial such that 
there is a reasonable likelihood that, in its absence, there would have been a more 
favorable result.'" State v. Carlson. 934 P.2d 657, 661 n.5 (Utah App. 1997) (quoting 
State v. Tennev, 913 P.2d 750, 754-55 (Utah App.) (citations omitted), cert, denied. 923 
P.2d 693 (Utah 1996)); see also State v. Basta. 966 P.2d 260, 268 (Utah App. 1998). "In 
assessing whether there was prejudicial error in the prosecutor's comments, we will 
consider the comments both in context of the arguments advanced by both sides as well 
as in context of all the evidence." State v. Bakalov. 1999 UT 45, ^  56, 979 P.2d 799. 
"[C]ounsel for each side has considerable latitude [in closing arguments] and may discuss 
18 
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fully his or her viewpoint of the evidence and the deductions arising therefrom." State v. 
Dunn, 850 P.2d 1201, 1223 (Utah 1993); Bakalov. atffl[ 56, 59. 
Defendant's argument fails because the prosecutor did not bring to the jury's 
attention a matter it would not be justified in considering in determining its verdict. 
Instead, the prosecutor tied his remarks directly to facts in evidence and provided a 
reasonable and permissible interpretation of that evidence from the State's point of view. 
The jury was free to infer the same from the evidence. See Bakalov, at fflf 57, 59. That 
defendants could be viewed as living in a drug house was a reasonable interpretation not 
only of the State's evidence of the large amount of drugs and paraphernalia in defendants' 
bedroom ceiling, but also of defendant's own evidence of the other significant amounts of 
drugs and paraphernalia found in defendants' son's bedroom and on a man defendant 
admits was living there at the time (R. 335:69, 73-75, 96, 132). Some of the 
paraphernalia showed signs of use, and there was significantly more methamphetamine in 
the house than would be expected for the personal use of the occupants (R. 335:57, 72-75, 
88-89, 90, 103). 
The significant amount of methamphetamine found in defendants' bedroom ceiling 
further supports the prosecutor's statement that defendants were drug dealers. The 
amount of methamphetamine, the location, the presence of the cutting agent and 
paraphernalia, and the lack of any other reasonable explanation for the drugs suggests that 
the defendants intended to sell the drugs. From the State's point of view, this evidence 
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reasonably supports a determination that defendants are drug dealers, a determination that 
the jury could also reasonably make. 
The same evidence supports the determination that there is no reasonable 
likelihood of a more favorable result for defendant absent the remarks. As stated, the jury 
had before it evidence of drugs, paraphernalia and drug use throughout the house. The 
amount of drugs exceeded fifteen times the normal amount for personal use. That fact 
taken with the large amount of cutting agent and numerous syringes, located in a spot and 
under conditions suggesting dominion and control by defendants with an intent to sell, 
provided compelling evidence that the defendants were guilty as charged. See Point I, 
supra. Even if the prosecutor had not said the words "drug dealers" or "drug house," the 
jury is reasonably likely to have rejected defendants' claim that someone else, having full 
access to the rest of the house, concealed the drugs in the ceiling of defendants' locked 
bedroom. 
POINT III 
DEFENDANT IS NOT ENTITLED TO DOUBLE JEOPARDY 
PROTECTION BECAUSE HE HAS NOT ESTABLISHED THAT 
THE PROSECUTOR ENGAGED IN BAD FAITH CONDUCT WITH 
THE INTENT TO PROVOKE A MISTRIAL IN ORDER TO 
OBTAIN A MORE FAVORABLE OPPORTUNITY TO CONVICT 
In his second and fourth points, defendant claims that double jeopardy should bar 
any retrial in the event his appeal is successful. Br. of Aplt at 18-19, 26-27. 
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"Generally, if a defendant seeks a mistrial, he waives any defense he might 
otherwise assert based upon double jeopardy, even though the prosecution or the court 
provoked the error. However, double jeopardy bars retrial where bad faith conduct by a 
judge or prosecutor is intended to provoke a mistrial so as to afford the prosecution a 
more favorable opportunity to convict." State v. Trafnv, 799 P.2d 704, 709 (Utah 1990) 
(citations omitted). 
Defendant's claim of double jeopardy protection fails because he has not 
established that his case falls within the exception to the general rule that a defendant may 
be retried after a mistrial. First, defendant is not entitled to declaration of a mistrial 
because any error in questioning Officer Adams was harmless.5 See Point I, supra. 
Second, defendant must establish not only that the prosecutor provoked the error, 
but that he did it in bad faith in order to obtain a more favorable opportunity to convict. 
Defendant has not shown this. Defendant claims that "the State was responsible for the 
error," so reversal with prejudice is warranted. Br. of Aplt. at 19, 27. However, 
responsibility is not the test. On this record, there is no indication that the prosecutor in 
bad faith embarked on the challenged questioning of Officer Adams and provoked the 
mention of the prior drug sale or that the prosecutor's conduct improved the chances of 
^Although defendant includes this argument twice in his brief, the substance of 
each argument relates solely to the questioning of Officer Adams, not to the prosecutor's 
closing remarks. Br. of Aplt. at 18-19, 26-27. 
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conviction in a new trial. Indeed, the trial court, from its advantaged position observed 
that it believed the elicited comment was inadvertent (R. 335:24) (Add. B). 
Defendant claims that the prosecutor should have known where the questioning 
was going, that the response would be prejudicial to defendant, and that some preliminary 
preparation of the witness or discussion with the court was necessary. Br. of Aplt. at 19, 
27. However, the brief, isolated response was in fact not prejudicial, and the mere fact of 
the questioning does not establish intentional bad faith. See Point I, supra. The 
prosecutor explained that his questioning was intended to establish the basic reason the 
officer obtained and executed a search warrant for defendants' home (R. 335:22-23). 
When the court informed the prosecutor that he should avoid the subject, the prosecutor 
scrupulously did so and did not mention it again. More important, defendant does not 
explain what benefit the prosecutor would gain in a retrial or why a retrial would provide 
a more favorable opportunity for conviction. 
The prosecutor's conduct does not suggest that he intentionally sought to provoke 
a mistrial in order to pursue a new trial against defendant. As the record does not reflect 
any bad faith by the prosecutor in exploring the basis of the search warrant, and defendant 
has not shown that the questioning was aimed at securing a second trial, defendant's 
appellate claim must fail. See Trafhy, 799 P.2d at 710. 
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CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, the State respectfully requests that this Court affirm 
defendant's convictions and sentences. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this On day of June, 2000. 
JAN GRAHAM 
Attorney General 
KxCtstS* C£^*^ 
KRIS C. LEONARD 
Assistant Attorney General 
MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I hereby certify that a true and accurate copy of the foregoing Brief of Appellee 
was mailed by first class mail, postage prepaid, to Randall Gaither, attorney for 
defendant/appellant, 321 South 600 East, Salt Lake City, Utah 84102, this &H day of 
June, 2000. 
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58-37-8. Prohibited acts — Penalties. 
(1) Prohibited acts A — Penalties: 
(a) Except as authorized by this chapter, it is unlawful for any person to 
knowingly and intentionally: 
(i) produce, manufacture, or dispense, or to possess with intent to 
produce, manufacture, or dispense, a controlled or counterfeit sub-
stance; 
(ii) distribute a controlled or counterfeit substance, or to agree, 
consent, offer, or arrange to distribute a controlled or counterfeit 
substance; 
(iii) possess a controlled or counterfeit substance with intent to 
distribute; or 
(iv) engage in a continuing criminal enterprise where: 
(A) the person participates, directs, or engages in conduct 
which results in any violation of any provision of Title 58, 
Chapters 37, 37a, 37b, 37c, or 37d that is a felony; and 
(B) the violation is a part of a continuing series of two or more 
violations of Title 58, Chapters 37, 37a, 37b, 37c, or 37d on 
separate occasions that are undertaken in concert with five or 
more persons with respect to whom the person occupies a position 
of organizer, supervisor, or any other position of management. 
(b) Any person convicted of violating Subsection dXa) with respect to: 
(i) a substance classified in Schedule I or II or a controlled sub-
stance analog is guilty of a second degree felony and upon a second or 
subsequent conviction is guilty of a first degree felony; 
(ii) a substance classified in Schedule III or IV, or marijuana, is 
guilty of a third degree felony, and upon a second or subsequent 
conviction is guilty of a second degree felony; or 
(iii) a substance classified in Schedule V is guilty of a class A 
misdemeanor and upon a second or subsequent conviction is guilty of 
a third degree felony. 
(c) Any person convicted of violating Subsection (lXaXiv) is guilty of a 
first degree felony punishable by imprisonment for an indeterminate term 
of not less than seven years and which may be for life. Imposition or 
execution of the sentence may not be suspended, and the person is not 
eligible for probation. 
(2) Prohibited acts B — Penalties: 
(a) It is unlawful: 
(i) for any person knowingly and intentionally to possess or use a 
controlled substance, unless it was obtained under a valid prescrip-
tion or order, directly from a practitioner while acting in the course of 
his professional practice, or as otherwise authorized by this subsec-
tion; 
(ii) for any owner, tenant, licensee, or person in control of any 
building, room, tenement, vehicle, boat, aircraft, or other place 
knowingly and intentionally to permit them to be occupied by persons 
unlawfully possessing, using, or distributing controlled substances in 
any of those locations; 
(iii) for any person knowingly and intentionally to possess an 
altered or forged prescription or written order for a controlled sub-
stance. 
(b) Any person convicted of violating Subsection (2XaXi) with respect to: 
(i) marijuana, if the amount is 100 pounds or more, is guilty of a 
second degree felony; 
(ii) a substance classified in Schedule I or II, marijuana, if the 
amount is more than 16 ounces, but less than 100 pounds, or a 
controlled substance analog, is guilty of a third degree felony; or 
(iii) marijuana, if the marijuana is not in the form of an extracted 
resin from any part of the plant, and the amount is more than one 
ounce but less than 16 ounces, is guilty of a class A misdemeanor. 
ic) Any person convicted of violating Subsection (2XaXi) while inside 
the exterior boundaries of property occupied by any correctional facility as 
defined in Section 64-13-1 or any public jail or other place of confinement 
shall be sentenced to a penalty one degree greater than provided in 
Subsection (2Xb). 
(d) Upon a second or subsequent conviction of possession of any 
controlled substance by a person, that person shall be sentenced to a one 
degree greater penalty than provided in this subsection. 
(e) Any person who violates Subsection (2XaXi) with respect to all other 
controlled substances not included in Subsection (2XbXi), (ii), or (iii), 
including less than one ounce of marijuana, is guilty of a class B 
misdemeanor. Upon a second conviction the person is guilty of a class A 
misdemeanor, and upon a third or subsequent conviction the person is 
guilty of a third degree felony. 
(f) Any person convicted of violating Subsection (2XaXii) or (2XaXiii) is: 
(i) on a first conviction, guilty of a class B misdemeanor, 
(ii) on a second conviction, guilty of a class A misdemeanor; and 
(iii) on a third or subsequent conviction, guilty of a third degree 
felony. 
(3) Prohibited acts C — Penalties: 
(a) It is unlawful for any person knowingly and intentionally: 
(i) to use in the course of the manufacture or distribution of a 
controlled substance a license number which is fictitious, revoked, 
suspended, or issued to another person or, for the purpose of obtaining 
a controlled substance, to assume the title of, or represent himself to 
be, a manufacturer, wholesaler, apothecary, physician, dentist, veteri-
narian, or other authorized person; 
(ii) to acquire or obtain possession of, to procure or attempt to 
procure the administration of, to obtain a prescription for, to prescribe 
or dispense to any person known to be attempting to acquire or obtain 
possession of, or to procure the administration of any controlled 
substance by misrepresentation or failure by the person to disclose his 
receiving any controlled substance from another source, fraud, forg-
ery, deception, subterfuge, alteration of a prescription or written order 
for a controlled substance, or the use of a false name or address; 
(iii) to make any false or forged prescription or written order for a 
controlled substance, or to utter the same, or to alter any prescription 
or written order issued or written under the terms of this chapter; or 
(iv) to make, distribute, or possess any punch, die, plate, stone, or 
other thing designed to print, imprint, or reproduce the trademark, 
trade name, or other identifying mark, imprint, or device of another or 
any likeness of any of the foregoing upon any drug or container or 
labeling so as to render any drug a counterfeit controlled substance. 
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(b) Any person convicted of violating Subsection (3Xa) is guilty of a 
third degree felony. 
(4) Prohibited acts D — Penalties: 
(a) Notwithstanding other provisions of this section, a person not 
authorized under this chapter who commits any act declared to be 
unlawful under this section, Title 58, Chapter 37a, Utah Drug Parapher-
nalia Act, or under Title 58, Chapter 37b, Imitation Controlled Substances 
Act, is upon conviction subject to the penalties and classifications under 
Subsection (4Kb) if the act is committed: 
(i) in a public or private elementary or secondary school or on the 
grounds of any of those schools; 
(ii) in a public or private vocational school or post-secondary 
institution or on the grounds of any of those schools or institutions; 
(iii) in those portions of any building, park, stadium, or other 
structure or grounds which are, at the time of the act, being used for 
an activity sponsored by or through a school or institution under 
Subsections (4XaXi) and (ii); 
(iv) in or on the grounds of a preschool or child-care facility; 
(v) in a public park, amusement park, arcade, or recreation center; 
(vi) in a church or synagogue; 
(vii) in a shopping mall, sports facility, stadium, arena, theater, 
movie house, playhouse, or parking lot or structure adjacent thereto; 
(viii) in a public parking lot or structure; 
(ix) within 1,000 feet of any structure, facility, or grounds included 
in Subsections (4XaXi) through (viii); or 
(x) with a person younger than 18 years of age, regardless of where 
the act occurs. 
(b) A person convicted under this subsection is guilty of a first degree 
felony and shall be imprisoned for a term of not less than five years if the 
penalty that would otherwise have been established but for this subsection 
would have been a first degree felony. Imposition or execution of the 
sentence may not be suspended, and the person is not eligible for 
probation. 
(c) If the classification that would otherwise have been established 
would have been less than a first degree felony but for this subsection, a 
person convicted under this subsection is guilty of one degree more than 
the maximum penalty prescribed for that offense. 
(d) It is not a defense to a prosecution under this subsection that the 
actor mistakenly believed the individual to be 18 years of age or older at 
the time of the offense or was unaware of the individual's true age; nor 
that the actor mistakenly believed that the location where the act occurred 
was not as described in Subsection (4Xa) or was unaware that the location 
where the act occurred was as described in Subsection (4Xa). 
(5) Any violation of this chapter for which no penalty is specified is a class 
B misdemeanor. 
(6) Any person who attempts or conspires to commit any offense unlawful 
under this chapter is upon conviction guilty of one degree less than the 
maximum penalty prescribed for that offense. 
(7) (a) Any penalty imposed for violation of this section is in addition to, and 
not in lieu of, any civil or administrative penalty or sanction authorized by 
law. 
(b) Where violation of this chapter violates a federal law or the law of 
another state, conviction or acquittal under federal law or the law of 
another state for the same act is a bar to prosecution in this state. 
(8) In any prosecution for a violation of this chapter, evidence or proof which 
shows a person or persons produced, manufactured, possessed, distributed, or 
dispensed a controlled substance or substances, is prima facie evidence that 
the person or persons did so with knowledge of the character of the substance 
or substances. 
(9) This section does not prohibit a veterinarian, in good faith and in the 
course of his professional practice only and not for humans, from prescribing, 
dispensing, or administering controlled substances or from causing the sub-
stances to be administered by an assistant or orderly under his direction and 
supervision. 
(10) Civil or criminal liability may not be imposed under this section on: 
(a) any person registered under the Controlled Substances Act who 
manufactures, distributes, or possesses an imitation controlled substance 
for use as a placebo or investigational new drug by a registered practitio-
ner in the ordinary course of professional practice or research; or 
(b) any law enforcement officer acting in the course and legitimate 
scope of his employment. 
(11) If any provision of this chapter, or the application of any provision to 
any person or circumstances, is held invalid, the remainder of this chapter 
shall be given effect without the invalid provision or application. 
History: L. 1971, ch. 146, ft 8; 1972, ch. 22, 
S 1; 1977, ch. 29, * 6; 1979, ch. 12, ft 5; 1985, 
ch. 146, ft 1; 1986, ch. 196, ft 1; 1987, ch. 92, 
§ 100; 1987, ch. 190, ft 3; 1988, ch. 96, * 1; 
1989, ch. 60, ft 2; 1989, ch. 66, ft 1; 1989, ch. 
178,$ 1; 1989, ch. 187, * 2; 1989, ch. 201, ft 1; 
1990, ch. 161, * 1; 1990, ch. 163, ft 2; 1990, 
ch. 163, ft 3; 1991, ch. 80, ft 1; }991, ch. 198, 
5 4; 1991, ch. 268, ft 7; 1996, ch. 284, ft 1; 
1996, ch. 1, ft 8; 1997, ch. 64, ft 6. 
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58-37a-5. Unlawful acts. 
(1) It is unlawful for any person to use, or to possess with intent to use, drug 
paraphernalia to plant, propagate, cultivate, grow, harvest, manufacture, 
compound, convert, produce, process, prepare, test, analyze, pack, repack, 
store, contain, conceal, inject, ingest, inhale or otherwise introduce a controlled 
substance into the human body in violation of this chapter. Any person who 
violates this subsection is guilty of a class B misdemeanor. 
(2) It is unlawful for any person to deliver, possess with intent to deliver, or 
manufacture with intent to deliver, any drug paraphernalia, knowing that the 
drug paraphernalia will be used to plant, propagate, cultivate, grow, harvest, 
manufacture, compound, convert, produce, process, prepare, test, analyze, 
pack, repack, store, contain, conceal, inject, ingest, inhale, or otherwise 
introduce a controlled substance into the human body in violation of this act. 
Any person who violates this subsection is guilty of a class A misdemeanor. 
(3) Any person 18 years of age or over who delivers drug paraphernalia to a 
person under 18 years of age who is three years or more younger than the 
person making the delivery is guilty of a third degree felony. 
(4) It is unlawful for any person to place in this state in any newspaper, 
magazine, handbill, or other publication any advertisement, knowing that the 
purpose of the advertisement is to promote the sale of drug paraphernalia. Any 
person who violates this subsection is guilty of a class B misdemeanor. 
History: L. 1981, ch. 76, 5 5. 
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Utah Drug Academy, through the Drug Enforcement 
Administration, and that was in Colorado. And basic 
training from just in-service training throughout the 
years. I'd say over 200 hours worth of training in this 
area . 
Q. Were you employed with the police department on 
May llth of 1997? 
A. Yes. 
Q. On that day did you receive information that 
led you to draft a search warrant? 
A. Yes, I did. 
Q. Could you indicate to the jury the residence 
for which that search warrant was sought? 
A. We received probable cause that there was drug 
activity going on in a home in Spanish Fork being at 88 
North 700 East, that being Debbie and Danny Bryan's 
home . 
Q. How did you know that was the Bryans' home? 
A. From past law enforcement experience, past 
involvements with the Bryans. 
Q. This information it provided, you indicated, 
probable cause. Could you explain what that is just 
briefly? 
MR. GAITHER: I'll object to the relevancy of 
that in these proceedings, your Honor. 
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THE COURT: I'll sustain the objection. I 
don't think it's relevant. 
MR. LARSON: Thank you, your Honor. 
Q. (BY MR. LARSON) The information you received 
was regarding what? 
A. Drug activity in the home, a previous sale. 
MR. GAITHER: Objection, your Honor. Move to 
strike. And I have a motion I think we should hear 
right now. 
THE COURT: All right. Let's excuse the jury 
for a few minutes and hear the motion. 
If you'll go with the bailiff, please. 
(The following proceedings were held 
in open court after the jury left the 
courtroom:) 
MR. GAITHER: At this time, your Honor --
THE COURT: Be seated, please. 
MR. GAITHER: -- I would move the Court for a 
mistrial. An objection was made about probable cause, 
and it was sustained. And this is exactly the reason 
that I didn't want to get into the -- Count No. I about 
distribution has been dismissed. And the prior drug 
sale situation here is not relevant. They don't have --
that evidence was based upon hearsay of a person who is 
not present. That's why they dismissed it. 
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So now we have this jury who has heard 
information about a prior drug sale and drug activity in 
the home. This is not -- there's no relevance for it. 
It was in an area that should not have been delved into, 
and I would submit there's no way this could be cured. 
It's extraordinarily prejudicial. This case may come 
down to whether my clients were found guilty because the 
possession with intent. And the jurors now have in 
their mind that there was a prior drug sale at the 
residence. And I don't believe the State has any 
evidence of that other than the hearsay of a person who 
is not present. 
THE COURT: Mr. Larson. 
MR. LARSON: Your Honor, if I remember the 
question, I never asked if there was any type of drug 
activity in the home prior to. I asked the officer if 
he knew the Bryans, and he indicated at that time that 
he knew the Bryans or how he knew it was the Bryans' 
residence. He simply indicated he knew the Bryans' 
residence because of prior law enforcement contact. He 
did not indicate that there was ever any sale or drugs 
as Mr. Gaither is referring to. We haven't even 
approached any information regarding the charge that ha 
been dismissed. 
I think the jury has a legitimate interest in 
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understanding the basis for the search warrant, so they 
can understand why a search warrant was drafted. We 
haven't heard any hearsay whatsoever in this particular 
case. The officer has related information. It's not 
been attributed to anybody in any way, shape, or form. 
We're just looking at the basis of the search warrant 
and the actions of the officer. 
Clearly, if it's not being offered for the 
matter of the truth asserted, the officer can indicate 
why he went and got a search warrant based on that. I 
don't think the jury has anything before it that would 
call for a mistrial in this particular case. 
And in addition to that, if we looked at Rule 
404(b), the officer can testify to prior circumstances 
for identification purposes. I think it fits squarely 
within the rules of evidence, especially Rule 404(b). 
We'd stand on that. 
MR. GAITHER: Well, we can have the court 
reporter read back what he indicated, but he did 
indicate there had been a prior drug sale. 
As far as using prior drug arrests for 
identification purposes, I know the Court would not 
allow that. That would result in a mistrial. 
And these types of cases, they go over there 
and they enter under the authority of a search warrant. 
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You don't have to tell the jury about all of the hearsay 
that was contained in the search warrant. And that's 
exactly what we were into, and that's what I tried to 
stop with the objection that was sustained. 
The prosecution has gone ahead, and now we've 
had before the jury very inflammatory, unnecessary, 
prejudicial information. And if this trial commences 
and keeps going, it's never going to be eradicated from 
their minds. They've now got information because the 
police went over there because of a drug sale when 
there's not going to be any such evidence introduced at 
trial. This was evidence which was in the prosecutors' 
ability to control, and they didn't control it. And now 
we've had the information that should result and I would 
request that the Court declare a mistrial and reschedule 
this for another day. 
THE COURT: All right. Let's go off the recorc 
and have the reporter check the question and the answer 
that was given. 
(Record read.) 
THE COURT: Well, the answer to the question 
does go into the subject matter to which the Court had 
sustained the previous objection. However, I think it 
was an inadvertent response, and I'm going to deny your 
motion, Mr. Gaither, at this time. 
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However, Mr. Larson, I'd caution you to not 
inquire into the subject matter of the warrant that was 
issued. The fact that it was issued is a legal matter 
anyway and what the cause for it would be. You're going 
to have to rely on direct evidence regarding the proof 
of your elements of distribution. 
MR. LARSON: That's fine, your Honor. Thank 
you 
m . 
THE COURT: All right. Let's bring them back 
MR. GAITHER: Excuse me, your Honor. Before 
the jury comes back, I would then move the Court to 
admonish the jury to disregard any of that. 
THE COURT: I'll do so. And I had not 
previously because I wanted to hear your objection 
before I did so. 
MR. GAITHER: And for the record it is still 
our position that the answer requires a mistrial, but we 
would, nonetheless, request a cautionary instruction. 
(The following proceedings were held 
in open court in the presence of the 
jury:) 
THE COURT: Be seated, please. Okay. Before 
beginning, I want to instruct the jury to disregard any 
previous statements made and if you've made notes of 
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them, to strike them and forget them. And the Court has 
determined that the issue of the search warrant is a 
legal matter, and the basis for the warrant has to do 
with elements of what we call probable cause. And 
that's a legal determination and one that I don't think 
you need to be concerned with, nor do I think it's 
relevant to the case. And that's why I have ordered an> 
comments regarding it to be stricken. So you may 
proceed. 
MR. LARSON: Thank you, your Honor. 
Q. (BY MR. LARSON) Officer, you obtained a 
search warrant; is that right? 
A. Yes, I did. 
Q. And where was that search warrant directing yc 
to search? 
A. The home of Danny and Debbie Bryan in Spanish 
Fork . 
Q. What was that address, once again? 
A. 88 North 700 East. 
Q. Did you execute that search warrant? 
A. Yes, I did. 
Q. Could you tell the jury when that took place? 
A. It took place at approximately 8:00 in the 
morning -- correction -- at 5:25 in the morning. 
Q. On what day? 
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INSTRUCTION N O ~ 3 £ _ 
Insofar as you are concerned, you may consider as evidence whatever is admitted in the 
trial as part of the record, whether it be the testimony of witnesses or an article or document 
marked as an exhibit, or other matter admitted, such as an admission, agreement, or stipulation. 
At times I have ruled upon objections to the admission of certain things into evidence. 
Questions relating to admissibility of evidence are solely questions of law and you must not 
concern yourself with my reasons for ruling as I have, or draw any inferences therefrom in favor 
of or against either party. In admitting evidence to which an objection is made, the Court does 
not determine what weight should be given such evidence; nor does it pass on the credibility of 
the witness. As to any question to which an objection was sustained, you must not conjecture as 
to what the answer might have been or as to the reason for the objection. 
Statements, arguments, and remarks of counsel are intended to help you in 
understanding the evidence and in applying the law, but they are not evidence. You should 
disregard any such utterance that has no basis in the evidence, unless such statement was made as 
an admission or stipulation conceding the existence of a fact or facts. 
If the Court has said or done anything which has suggested to you that it is inclined to 
favor the claims or positions or either party, you will not permit yourself to be influenced by any 
such suggestion. Neither in these instructions nor in any ruling action, or remark that I have made 
during the course of this trial have I intended to interpose any opinion or suggestion as to how I 
would resolve any of the factual issues of this case. 
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1 No. 20, defense counsel spent a lot of time on 
2 the nexus between the defendant and the drugs. All I 
3 can say is from what you have heard is the defendants 
4 carried on a drug house. If you look at the evidence 
5 that was brought in -- and if you want to know the 
6 reason the State didn't bring in this particular 
7 canister or-this or that is because they were found in 
8 different rooms. This was found in the defendants1 
9 child's room. And this, of course, was located next to 
10 that. Does that bring or cast a disparaging point at 
11 the State because we didn't use evidence that tends to 
12 incriminate somebody else? No, it doesn't. All this 
13 does is serve to show that the defendants were in a drug 
14 house, and that was brought in by the defense in that 
15 regard. 
16 Now, as for the syringes, the State will take 
17 for granted -- we'll tell you right straight out there 
18 are probably syringes in here that are not attributable 
19 to the defendant. In fact, there are 3, as the officer 
20 testified. There are 14 in this package securely 
21 fastened for safety purposes. And there's a standard 
22 procedure for officers to do that. And in here are 11 
23 syringes that were found in the attic which were found 
24 next to this particular package and the other package 
25 that has the cutting material in it. 
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This is the focus of the case, ladies and 
gentlemen. It is not the fact that there are 3 syringes 
in this package that might belong to somebody else. 
There are 11 in here that are belong and are 
attributable directly to the defendants because they 
were found in a place where the defendants had special 
control. That's what Instruction No. 20 says. 
It says such as a closet, drawer containing the 
accused's clothing, personal effects, presence of 
paraphernalia among the accused's effects, or in a place 
under which the accused has special control. This is a 
place of special control. This was in their room. It 
was in the ceiling in their room. They locked the door. 
They have a bolt lock on it. 
You can take and you can infer that they had 
all the intent necessary, that they had all,the 
requirements for possession necessary to distribute 
these drugs, possess and distribute these drugs. 
Now, o'nce again, I would request that you go 
into your deliberations, you use the faculties that 
you've been given, you apply the facts as they've been 
presented, and you apply the law that has been 
presented, and you find the defendants guilty of all the 
counts charged, especially the possession of a drug with 
intent to distribute because they are drug dealers, and 
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this case will prove it. Thank you. 
THE COURT: I'll now ask the clerk to swear the 
bailiff to take the jury in charge. 
THE CLERK: You do solemnly swear that you will 
keep this jury together in some convenient place until 
they agree upon a verdict or have been discharged by the 
Court; that .you will not suffer any communication to be 
made to them or make any yourself, except to ask them if 
they have agreed upon a verdict; that you will not, 
before the verdict is rendered, communicate to any 
person the state of their deliberations or the verdict 
agreed upon; and that you will return them into court 
when they have agreed or when so ordered by the Court, 
so help you God. 
THE BAILIFF: Yes. 
THE COURT: All right. If youfll now go with 
the bailiff to the jury room to commence deliberations. 
The instructions and verdict forms will be provided to 
you and all of the exhibits which were received in 
evidence. 
(At 5:53 the jury left the courtroom 
to deliberate, and the following 
proceedings were held in open court:] 
THE COURT: Okay. Counsel, are there any othe] 
matters at this time? 
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